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Abstract. Night distribution and consolidation strategies have been proposed in many cities to increase the efficiency of 
the urban goods distribution system and to reduce the external effects that it causes in terms of emissions. However, the 
deployment of these initiatives presents a new reallocation of costs and incomes among collaborative stakeholders that take 
part in. In this paper, an analytical model to estimate the new economic effects caused by these strategies on the involved 
agents is presented, based on continuous approximations. This model allows decision makers to estimate the transporta-
tion cost and emissions savings that will be obtained by each strategy as well as the range of retailer demand in which these 
strategies are not economically feasible. The results show that night distribution generally outperforms the carrier cost re-
duction and emissions savings, especially when large vehicles are used in night periods.
Keywords: urban goods distribution, stakeholder collaboration, consolidation, night deliveries, air quality.
Introduction
The distribution of products in metropolitan areas is ex-
pected to increase in the next years in absolute values 
[tones], frequencies and quality requirements, according 
to the concentration of population in these areas (Barone, 
Roach 2016; Van Audenhove et al. 2015). The e-commerce 
growth and the new characteristics of supply chains (just-
in-time, stock 0, distribution in narrow time windows) 
will also put more pressure on the physical distribution of 
goods in urban crowded areas (Allen et al. 2018). 
Following system engineering principles, the goods 
distribution in a city should use a set of resources (ve-
hicles, energy, personnel, urban space) to provide an 
adequate service according to the expected demand of 
products (Foltyński 2016; Kawamura 2014). Since the 
goods distribution is the physical reflection of economic 
relationships among stakeholders, any inefficient or insuf-
ficient provision of freight services may result in a reduc-
tion of the economic activity in the city (Taniguchi 2014). 
However, urban goods distribution generates multiple 
negative effects, worsening the environment and liveabil-
ity of agglomerations in terms of congestion, air quality, 
noise nuisance and pavement deterioration (Schoemak-
er et  al. 2006; NCFRP 2012). In this context, transport 
policies should promote the maximization of the product 
economy profit as well as the minimization of negative 
externalities that would affect the social welfare (Holguín-
Veras, Sánchez-Díaz 2016). 
In order to tackle the rising environmental and live-
able conflicts of goods distribution in urban areas, there 
is a wide set of ecological innovation measures promoted 
by local agencies with the support of national and supra-
national funds. Several European projects have analysed 
the results of new logistic measures implemented in cities 
(Allen et al. 2007; STRAIGHTSOL 2014; CITYLOG 2013; 
SMARTFREIGHT 2016). In Holguín-Veras et al. (2015), 
54 different good distribution strategies are identified. For 
each of them, an analysis of the major potentialities and 
weaknesses is provided. Due to the presence of multiple 
stakeholders with opposite objectives, and the lack of ex-
ante assessment methodologies to estimate the potential 
impacts of initiatives on each agent, the results achieved 
vary significantly and depend on the site’s physical char-
acteristics and the organizational framework. 
From a global perspective, the costs and emissions in-
curred by a carrier distributing parcels to a set of custom-
ers, is usually considered a function of the total number of 
kilometres run and the time spent by the fleet, multiplied 
by the corresponding unit factor parameters (unit cost or 
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emission factors) (EMEP/EEA 2013). Cost and emission 
savings can be achieved through initiatives that propose 
the usage of an eco-friendly and efficient fleet (lower unit 
factors), with some temporal and spatial restrictions. 
However, these are just a partial solution for a more com-
plex problem: the aforementioned new characteristics of 
supply chains have increased the commercial vehicle mile-
age. Therefore, a new radical change in the effects of goods 
distribution can only be achieved by promoting strategies 
that address the reduction of the total distance overcome 
by commercial vehicles. Nevertheless, these strategies usu-
ally involve a highly demanding scheme of collaboration 
among stakeholders or a new market situation, since any 
reduction of current vehicle routes need the voluntary or 
mandatory acceptance of carriers, retailers and suppliers 
(Holguín-Veras et al. 2015).
Two of the most controversial collaboration measures 
in urban distribution are night distribution and carrier-
led consolidation strategies. In SUGAR and STRAIGHT-
SOL projects, both solutions were widely analysed, tested 
and evaluated in several demonstrations (SUGAR 2011; 
STRAIGHTSOL 2014; Johansen et al. 2014). According to 
Holguín-Veras, Sánchez-Díaz (2016), the former solution 
is aimed at changing the timing of deliveries out of peak 
traffic hours while the latter tries to change the destination 
of supplies at a common facility, where products are con-
solidated. These solutions are currently incorporated into 
Urban Mobility Plans (UMPs) to tackle air quality prob-
lems in urban areas, based on the proved results obtained 
in different worldwide pilot tests. Unfortunately, the target 
emission and cost savings presented in these UMPs have 
not been properly estimated considering the particulari-
ties of each city. In fact, city councils often consider both 
measures valid solutions to reduce the externalities of ur-
ban goods distribution, not taking into account the ur-
ban logistics sector and the new required collaboration 
schemes among stakeholders in depth. Hence, economic 
tools to set target reductions are strongly needed by city 
councils as well as to identify which measure fits better to 
the situation of urban logistics in each city. In this context, 
the main motivation of this work is to help public authori-
ties make a decision on new collaborative solutions for 
their city, as long as goods distribution policies are con-
cerned. This assistance is made by identifying the most 
efficient collaborative strategy that responds to transport 
policy objectives, enabling to make an ex-ante assessment 
and comparison of the solutions by means of economic 
and environmental metrics for an urban good distribu-
tion strategy.
Therefore, this paper is aimed at providing robust es-
timations of emissions and operating cost savings caused 
by night distribution and consolidation strategies. An as-
sessment model based on continuous approximations is 
developed for both strategies providing compact formulas 
dependent to a set of input parameters that define the kin-
ematic and economic characteristics of goods distribution 
in each case site. It also captures the cash flows among 
stakeholders and their profitability due to the new collabo-
rative scheme in urban goods distribution system. The an-
alytical model allows comparing the achievements caused 
by both measures and identifying which solution would 
provide the highest cost and emission savings. In Sec-
tion 1, the background and contributions related to both 
strategies are commented. The analytical model for night 
distribution and consolidation strategies is developed in 
Section 2. The comparative analysis of the results obtained 
by each strategy is developed in Section 3. Finally, the key 
issues regarding the implementation and achievements of 
both strategies are presented in the last section.
1. Background
The efficiency of urban goods distribution can be im-
proved by means of a different collaborative relationship 
among stakeholders in multiple elements of the supply 
chains. Collaborating agents may share administrative 
practices (transactional collaboration), exchange informa-
tion (informational collaboration) and even coordinate the 
supply chain planning (decisional collaboration) in order 
to achieve a common objective (Gonzalez-Feliu, Salanova 
2012). There are two levels of collaboration (Gonzalez-Fe-
liu et al. 2013a): Vertical collaboration, in which multiple 
stakeholders responsible for different stages of the supply 
chain cooperate in order to provide a better performance 
to final customers; and, horizontal cooperation where pri-
vate or public bodies that belong to the same agent typol-
ogy (supplier, receiver, carrier) work together at the same 
level of supply chain. 
Off-Hours and night Distribution (OHD) of goods 
is a traditional vertical collaborative measure aimed at 
switching the deliveries from commercial hours to off-
peak periods (Holguín-Veras et  al. 2015). This solution 
increases the efficiency of the urban goods distribution 
system and improves the livability of cities, as environ-
mental benefits are achieved (Holguín-Veras et al. 2017a; 
Yannis et al. 2006). This strategy is focused on carriers but 
need the involvement of retailers. In spite of the easiness 
of implementation, both, carriers and receivers, should 
be benefitted from this solution. According to Holguín-
Veras et al. (2017b), carriers are usually in favour of this 
initiative since deliveries are made in a higher productive 
time period, resulting in a reduction of the number of 
vehicles needed to fulfil all retailers’ orders. In addition 
to that, carriers can be benefited by a higher availability 
of load/unload parking spaces since several street lanes 
in the peak hour can be used in night period for urban 
distribution (Holguín-Veras, Sánchez-Díaz 2016). For the 
city council, this measure is quite attractive since it allevi-
ates congestion and emission episodes at the expenses of 
increasing the noise nuisance in the night period. 
The main issue for the deployment of this initiative 
is the receivers’ acceptance. Receivers may be benefitted 
by OHD in terms of reliability since they would have 
products delivered early in the morning (Holguín-Veras, 
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Sánchez-Díaz 2016). In fact, any disturbance or failure in 
the supply of products can be fixed early in the morn-
ing, before the opening of the establishment. However, 
OHD usually implies additional personnel cost (present 
staff for receiving deliveries) and security cost (cameras 
and other devices) for receivers and increases the risk of 
property damage or theft at the shop where supplies are 
delivered (Holguín-Veras et al. 2017b). All these problems 
are more relevant for small retailers and local shops. On 
the contrary, big department stores may have personnel 
responsible for store replenishment that would receive the 
shipments out of the commercial hours. This statement 
is based on the current supply practice of supermarkets, 
clothes departments that everyone can notice at night in 
several European cities.
In order to compensate receivers for these effects, the 
deployment of this initiative should need the provision of 
monetary incentives in order to persuade retailers to take 
part in it. Several contributions have analysed the role of 
on-going monetary incentives to afford the new person-
nel cost when staff is receiving supplies at night, the new 
scheme of freight fares and the necessary conditions to 
promote night distribution (Holguín-Veras et  al. 2007; 
Holguín-Veras, Aros-Vera 2015; Holguín-Veras et al. 2011; 
Brom et al. 2011). Alternatively, unattended deliveries can 
be performed by carriers at night period when retailers 
have a trust vendor. In these situations, receiver monetary 
incentives are only necessary one time (tax rebate or cash 
payment) in order to deploy the required security devices 
to receive products at night without the presence of staff. 
Monetary incentives can also be found as carrier fare dis-
counts, since this agent may transfer a fraction of the op-
erating cost savings to receivers.
Several contributions have been focused on the re-
sponse of receivers and even carriers to night distribution 
based on discrete choice models (Holguín-Veras et  al. 
2008b), behaviour microsimulation (Silas, Holguín-Veras 
2009) and upper bound estimations. A complete analysis 
of the acceptance of this solution by retailers is presented 
in Holguín-Veras et al. (2017a). From a survey conducted 
in New York (Holguín-Veras et  al. 2013), the receiver’s 
willingness to participate in unattended OHD would be 
38% when a one- time incentive of $9000 would be pro-
vided to each receiver. The receivers, which have a trusted 
vendor present a willingness 1.4 times higher to move to 
OHD. Therefore, the availability of a trusted vendor is an 
important fact to promote OHD. In a recent voluntary 
OHD program conducted in Manhattan in 2010, it has 
been demonstrated that those establishments that had staff 
present in the OHD, changed to regular-hour deliveries 
at the end of the pilot due to the personnel cost (once 
incentives were not available). On the contrast, retailers 
that had opted for unattended deliveries continued in the 
program once incentives were removed (Holguín-Veras 
et al. 2013).
From the carrier perspective, one of the main factors 
that determine the attractiveness of this solution is the 
spatial distribution of receivers within the area of service 
(Holguín-Veras 2011). If a specific region of the city has 
receivers to be served at regular and OHD periods, the 
distributing routes will overlap and carrier will incur in 
additional costs. Therefore, geographic-oriented incentives 
are needed to foster the participation of all receivers in a 
given region into the night distribution program.
The cost reduction of carriers, shippers and receivers 
caused by off-peak distribution initiative was estimated to 
be $100…200 million per year from the results of the pi-
lot test in New York (Holguín-Veras et al. 2011). In other 
implementations in Sao Pablo and Bogotá, the cost sav-
ings experienced by carriers were around 30% and the lo-
cal pollutants were reduced by 55…65% – Holguín-Veras 
et al. (2016) from the results reported in CISLOG (2015) 
and Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2015). As a result 
of the promising achievements, other cities like Chicago, 
Boston, Atlanta, London, and Toronto are also analyzing 
the implementation of OHD while Copenhagen and Brus-
sels have carried out pilot tests whose achievements are 
quite similar with the New York program (Holguín-Veras 
et al. 2017a).
The second urban distribution measure considered in 
this paper is the carrier-led consolidation strategy. Freight 
consolidation aims at reducing the number of commercial 
vehicles by grouping their loads into routes with higher 
load factor (Holguín-Veras, Sánchez-Díaz 2016). Receiver-
led consolidation combine shipments of different suppli-
ers in order to reduce the number of incoming vehicles 
at a specific demand attraction pole, building or facility. 
This measure needs the leadership of receivers in order to 
change the purchasing policy to a given set of suppliers 
or consolidate their shipments before being distributed to 
the receiver locations. A successful implementation of this 
concept is identified in The Netherlands under the name 
Binnenstadservice case (Van Rooijen, Quak 2010). This 
solution can be considered an example of horizontal col-
laboration, since all receivers are coordinated to perform a 
common contracting and ordering policy to carriers.
Alternatively, the consolidation policy that has received 
more attention in the literature is the carrier-led consoli-
dation strategy. It is based on pre-locations or facilities 
visited by multiple carriers where cargo is consolidated 
and loaded into vehicles that would perform the last-
mile distribution to receivers scattered in an urban area 
(Holguín-Veras, Sánchez-Díaz 2016). This measure often 
implies the deployment of Consolidation Facilities (CFs) 
such as Urban Consolidation Centres (UCC) or Urban 
stage Areas (UsA) – Holguín-Veras et al. (2008a). In these 
urban facilities, goods are sorted and loaded into a new 
fleet managed by the CF operator. Then, this fleet, which 
usually consists of environmentally friendly vehicles, will 
deliver goods to the final retailers. This kind of consoli-
dation strategy implies a strong horizontal collaboration 
among carriers visiting the CF. However, the reluctance of 
some shippers to take part in this new distribution system 
and the entrance of new agents to operate the CF (public 
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authority, companies specialized in eco-friendly vehicles 
different from traditional carriers) imply a new vertical 
stakeholder collaboration in the supply chain. 
In Browne et  al. (2005), an extensive analysis of the 
potential effects of UCC on different stakeholders was 
conducted. They also justify, as a huge number of con-
tributions do Allen et  al. (2014) and Estrada, Roca-Riu 
(2017), that this strategy may reduce the local distance 
covered by regular carriers, can improve the efficiency and 
reduce the externalities caused by freight vehicles in urban 
areas. Consequently, the mileage and the emissions pro-
duced by urban distribution vehicles are also diminished 
in an urban area. One of the strengths of this strategy is 
that it is addressed to the agent that moves cargo and will 
experience the operating cost savings, i.e. carriers. A re-
duced number of carriers may be responsible for a large 
amount of shipments to be consolidated in the facility 
(Estrada, Roca-Riu 2017). In fact, carriers would pass the 
operating cost of distributing cargo from CF to receiver’s 
location to a new stakeholder: the CF operator. Therefore, 
in the consolidation program, the CF operator will incur 
the costs associated to the last mile distribution as well as 
the fixed cost associated to run the CF. Economic com-
pensations are needed under the form of carrier fares, 
receiver fees or subsidies in favour of CF operator. On 
the other hand, receivers are supposed to behave neutral 
against this policy since they do not receive any economic 
sign of the collaborative scheme. However, they can also 
be benefitted by the carrier-consolidation program since 
their business activity would not be as much interrupted 
as in regular distribution when this retailer receives a 
significant number of deliveries per day (Holguín-Veras, 
Sánchez-Díaz 2016). Nevertheless, the agent that would be 
negatively affected by the deployment of UCC or UsA is 
the shipper. The cargo transhipments at UCC make that 
shippers lose the product tracking and control in the last 
steps of the supply chain as well as the contact to the final 
customers. Therefore, shippers are reluctant to participate 
in consolidation programs that imply giving other compa-
nies a chance to contact their current customers (Navarro 
et al. 2016). 
Regarding the distribution network planning based on 
a CF, the proper location of this centre is analysed in Gon-
zalez-Feliu et al. (2014). The estimation of the logistic cost 
and emission savings caused by consolidation programs 
by means of continuous approximations are presented in 
Roca-Riu, Estrada (2012), Roca-Riu et al. (2016), Estrada, 
Roca-Riu (2017) and Saberi, Verbas (2012). Janjevic, Ndi-
aye (2017) estimate the different cost components of those 
collaborating carriers when using a UCC.
In spite of the promising theoretical results, a high 
number of UCC pilot tests has not succeeded. From more 
than 75 UCC European initiatives analysed, only 25 were 
currently in service in 2011 (Gonzalez-Feliu et al. 2013b). 
Similar values can be identified in a worldwide UCC 
analysis (Allen et al. 2012). According to Holguín-Veras, 
Sánchez-Díaz (2016), this is due to the expensive space 
that UCC needs in the surroundings of the commercial 
area where retailers are located; and the additional logistic 
cost that the cargo transhipment implies. To overcome this 
problem, the deployment of a UCC needs the participa-
tion of multiple carriers, or alternatively the provision of 
public subsidies to receivers or CF operator. When these 
subsidies had been removed, the vast majority of UCC 
were no longer in service in a voluntary carrier consoli-
dation program (Kin et al. 2016; Lebeau et al. 2017). In 
order to alleviate this problem, UsA, where a non-expen-
sive structure is installed in an existing facility (parking, 
commercial mall) are becoming popular due to the lower 
investment needed (Holguín-Veras et al. 2008a; Navarro 
et al. 2016). 
Other contributions proposed a mandatory consolida-
tion measure in which regular carriers were forced to visit 
the UCC by regulation (Van Rooijen, Quak 2010; Quak, 
Tavasszy 2011). Therefore, a detailed study of the new cost 
and incomes allocation among collaborating stakeholders 
is needed to fulfil feasible UCC–UsA business models. This 
is partially addressed in several quantified assessments of 
the impacts of UCC in specific implementation cases in 
Europe, North American and Japan cities (Paddeu et al. 
2014; Köhler 2001; Kawamura, Lu 2007; Chen et al. 2012; 
Gonzalez-Feliu, Morana 2011). However, the conclusions 
are somehow specific to each case study and it is difficult 
to extrapolate the achievements to other physical contexts. 
2. Profitability analysis of urban  
distribution measures
The modelling approach to estimate the overall transpor-
tation cost and profitability for each stakeholder involved 
in the urban goods distribution system is developed in 
this section. Several models are proposed to that end, 
based on continuous approximations of the crucial system 
variables. The main general assumptions considered along 
the paper are commented below. We suppose that M car-
riers provide freight transportation services in a compact 
region of a city of area A. The maximal allowable parcel 
volume to be served in regular distribution is ymax. Each 
carrier ( ) 1 ,  ...,i i M=  is responsible of serving Ni retailers 
that are uniformly distributed over the region of service. 
It is assumed that each receiver ( ) 1 ,  ..., ik k N=  only orders 
one shipment per day, and the volume of this shipment yk 
is uniformly distributed in ( )max0,ky y∈ . Therefore, the 
city presents a total demand of 
1
M
i
i
N N
=
=∑  that shipments 
will be served by different carriers. Hence, the total den-
sity of retailers to be served is equal to N
A
d = . Let ( )F y  
be the cumulative distribution function of products whose 
volume is less or equal to ymax in the total area of service, 
satisfying ( )0 0F y = =  and ( )max 1F y y= = . The expecta-
tion of the volume of products demanded by one receiver 
in the region is estimated by ( ) ( )
max
0
y
E y y f y dy= ⋅∫ , where 
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( )f y  is the corresponding probability density function of 
the parcel’s volume. ( )F y  and ( )f y  are deterministic 
functions that can be defined taking into account the data 
of those parcels served by carriers.
In order to fulfil the distribution services required by 
all receivers N, we will consider three available distribu-
tion strategies:
 – Strategy A. Regular Distribution. As in Holguín-
Veras (2008), this strategy represents the situation 
in which carriers visit the receiver’s location along 
the commercial hours of shops, i.e. during the peak 
hour of traffic (generally from 8:00 AM to 6:00 PM). 
All stakeholders do business as usual, and there is 
no need of incentives or facilities deployment to pro-
mote a spatial or temporal shift of cargo deliveries. 
Therefore, Strategy A does not represent any kind of 
collaboration among stakeholders. Carrier’s vehicles 
depart from a depot (distribution centre) located out 
of the city and visit the locations of receivers. When 
each vehicle has delivered all goods at the end of the 
tour, it returns to the distribution centre. 
 – Strategy B. Night Distribution. It consists of moving 
shipments of several carriers to the night or off-peak 
traffic period in order to take advantage of the faster 
cruising speeds and the greater availability of loading/
unloading parking slots. The spatial configuration of 
the distribution network is identical to Strategy  A 
although the operation of this network at off-peak 
hours provides higher performance than Strategy A. 
As it is stated in Holguín-Veras, Aros-Vera (2015), 
some receivers are quite reluctant to take part in this 
initiative even if incentives will be provided. Hence, 
we consider that only a fraction ( )0 1m ≤ m ≤  of the 
total number of receivers is distributed within the 
night period. The rest of receivers will be visited un-
der regular conditions, in the same circumstances as 
in Strategy A. 
 – Strategy C. Distribution through a consolidation 
facility. It involves the aggrupation of several ship-
ments belonging to different retailers and carriers 
into one commercial route that will visit final receiv-
ers. This strategy is aimed at incrementing the load 
factor of vehicles and reducing fleet size. Here, the 
spatial configuration of the distribution network is 
modified. We suppose that a new CF is deployed 
within the boundaries of the city of area A. This facil-
ity is operated by a new stakeholder: the CF operator. 
Considering Roca-Riu, Estrada (2012) and Browne 
et al. (2005), the entire number of deliveries is not 
suitable to be routed through the CF. The character-
istics of freight (urgent, perishable, etc.) or receivers 
determine the viability of using the CF to fulfil the 
distribution service. Therefore, we consider that just 
a fraction of the total receivers will be served through 
the CF by the fleet managed by the CF operator. The 
rest of receivers will be visited by the carrier fleet in a 
similar way as in Strategy A. All receivers (served via 
CF or in regular conditions) will be visited during the 
commercial hours. The CF operator is responsible for 
the reception of shipments from many carriers at this 
facility, classification of the products with regard to 
the destination, loading these products into the last 
mile vehicles managed by CF operator and perform-
ing the routes from the CF to the final retailers to 
be visited. Therefore, regular carriers are no longer 
incurring the transportation cost associated to the 
local distribution of those products routed through 
the CF to the final retailers. However, each carrier 
1, ...,i M=  is supposed to pay a constant fare qCF per 
parcel to the CF operator in order to compensate the 
handling costs at the CF and the costs of the local 
distribution to the retailer location. The justification 
of this assumption is further explained in Estrada 
and Roca-Riu (2017). 
Strategy A is considered as the base situation that 
represents the regular distribution performed by non-col-
laborative carriers. Hence, the profitability of each stake-
holder in night distribution or consolidation strategies 
will be accounted, comparing several metrics estimated in 
this collaborative Strategy (B or C) and the corresponding 
variables in Strategy A. 
In Strategy A, we suppose that vehicles depart from a 
depot (distribution centre) located at distance r from the 
centre of the service area. As a difference from Robusté 
et al. (1990), we assume that the depot is deployed outside 
the city boundaries ( A)r > . The transportation costs of 
one carrier i in the regular distribution of Strategy A (Fig-
ure 1a) are proportional to the access distance ,ALH iD  from 
the distribution centre to the distributing area in the city, 
the local distance within area A to visit retailers ,AL iD  and 
the service time  AiT  (travel time and visiting time) ac-
cording to Equation (1). Parameters cd [€/veh⋅km] and 
ct [€/veh⋅h] capture the unit distance and temporal costs 
respectively. 
( ), ,,A A A Ad L i LH i t iC iZ c D D c T+⋅ ⋅= + .  (1) 
By means of continuous approximation models de-
fined in Estrada, Roca-Riu (2017) and Roca-Riu et  al. 
(2016), the access distance, the local distance and the 
service time in all routes can be estimated by Equations 
(2a), (2b) and (2c) respectively. We use the L1 metric to 
determine the distance evaluation in the service area for 
the simplicity. The variable y determines the maximal 
number of retailers that one vehicle is able to serve in the 
same tour, obeying the maximal volumetric constraints. In 
regular conditions, carriers will use a homogeneous fleet 
of capacity C. The vehicle capacity C is defined as the total 
volume of parcels that one vehicle can carry. Therefore, 
( )
 C
E y
y =  is the expected maximal number of receivers 
that one carrier tour is able to visit. Although variable y 
would be also affected by temporal routing constraints, 
we consider in this paper that volumetric constraints are 
more severe than temporal constraints.
The mathematical operator x +    calculates the upper 
integer value of variable x. The parameters vL, vLH corre-
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spond, respectively, to the cruising speed within the urban 
area A and the access phase from distribution centre (out 
of the city) to the city boundaries. Eventually, the param-
eter t  captures the required time to perform one stop for 
visiting a retailer along the route. 
, 2ALH i
N
D
+
 
= ⋅r ⋅  y 
i ;  (2a)
( )1 2,
2
3
A
L i iD A N= ⋅ ⋅ ;  (2b)
, ,L i LH iA
i i
L LH
D D
T N
v v
 
= + + t ⋅ 
 
.  (2c)
2.1. Night distribution analysis (Strategy B)
We consider that only a fraction ( )0 1m ≤ m ≤  of the total 
receivers N to be served in the urban area can be visited 
in the night period. In this model, the distribution shift of 
one retailer from day to night period is randomly gener-
ated with a probability m independently from the volume 
demanded of each retailer and the retailer location. There-
fore, any receiver has the same probability to be served at 
night period. The pending of parcels ( )1 N−m ⋅  will be 
delivered to the final customers with the regular fleet dur-
ing commercial hours.
The model to assess the profitability of night distribu-
tion addressed here is similar to the provided in Holguín-
Veras (2008). In the aforementioned contribution, com-
pact formulas in order to estimate the operating cost are 
presented, depending on the range of overlapping regions 
served within day and night periods and the toll to be paid 
in regular distribution. In this paper, we do not consider any 
toll to be paid by carriers in day periods and the location 
of those retailers to be served at night is randomly chosen. 
In Strategy B, carrier will operate two different net-
works. On one hand, the fraction of parcels ( )1−m  will be 
served during the day period. We consider that there will 
be several retailers that will not switch to receiving night 
deliveries due to the extra cost that they may generate. The 
regular fleet of the carrier will overcome an access dis-
tance ,BLH iD   and a local distance ,BL iD  within the urban 
area, spending a total routing time  BiT  (Figure 1b). The 
estimation of these variables can be made through Equa-
tions (2a)–(2c), replacing the variable Ni by ( )1iN ⋅ −m . 
On the other hand, the pending fraction of parcels iN ⋅m 
will be served during the night turn, taking advantage of 
the more productive period. In this phase, the vehicles 
will incur an access and local distance given by ,BLH iD and 
,
B
L iD  respectively. To do so, we suppose that the fleet will 
need a total amount of time  NiT  to perform the overall 
parcels. In the night distribution, new unit cost Ndc and 
N
tc  are considered, since the fleet typology chosen in the 
night period may be different from the one that operates 
the regular distribution. The estimation of the previous 
distances can be made identically to the daily period, 
considering a total number of retailers given by iN ⋅m . 
However, the estimation of the travel time in the night 
period is provided in Equation (3), where NLv , NLHv  and 
Nt  parameters correspond to the cruising speed in the 
urban area, cruising speed in the access phase and stop-
ping time for each retailer in the night period, respectively. 
We assume that these speeds will be higher than the cor-
responding values in the regular distribution due to the 
congestion episodes. Moreover, the night stopping time of 
vehicles at retailer locations is supposed to be lower than 
the same parameter at day operations, since there is more 
availability of load/unload parking slots. For the sake of 
simplicity we suppose that the distribution during the day 
period in Strategies A and B is performed with the same 
vehicle technology of capacity C. 
, ,
N N
L i LH iN N
i iN N
L LH
D D
T N
v v
 
= + + t m

⋅ ⋅

.  (3)
Therefore, the necessary condition to be fulfilled in 
Strategy B in order to ensure a positive profitability for 
carriers is stated in Equation (4). The hN variable, the ra-
tio between the carrier cost in Strategy B (day and night 
deliveries) and the corresponding cost to Strategy A, must 
be lower than 1 to provide cost savings. However, con-
sidering externalities, Equation (5) determines the neces-
sary condition in order to reduce the monetary cost of the 
emissions produced in Strategy B with regard to Strategy 
A by means of the hE ratio. In Equation (5), ( )Lvε  and 
( )LHvε  variables represent respectively the emission 
monetization of pollutants CO2, NOx and PM2.5 of the 
vehicles in the local distribution within the city bounda-
ries and in the access phase from distribution centres to 
the city centre. The former variables can be estimated by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 X XCO CO NO NO€ € € ,PM PMv f v f v f v D⋅ ⋅ ⋅ε = + + ⋅  
where €x  is the emission cost of one kilogram of pol-
Figure 1. Comparison of distribution phases in Strategy A (a) and Strategy B (b and c)
Strategy A
Distribution
center
Strategy B
D
r
DALH,i
DAL,i
D D
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lutant x (€/kg x), ( )xf v  is the emission factor of pollut-
ant x associated to the vehicle fleet chosen (kg x/veh⋅km) 
and D the distance overcome by the fleet under analysis 
(veh⋅km), estimated by Equations (2a) and (2b).
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1;
N N N B B N N B
L LH d LH L t td
N A A A
d L LH t
c D D c D D c T c T
c D D c T
+ + + + +
h
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅
= ≤
+ +
 (4)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1.
B N N B N N
LH LH LH LH L L L L
E A A
L L LH LH
D v D v D v D v
D v D v
ε + ε + ε + ε
h =
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
ε⋅ ⋅
≤
ε +
 
(5)
The corresponding necessary conditions for retailers 
are not provided because they do not experience a cost 
variation. As it was commented from several pilot tests, 
several retailers experience higher reliability of supply 
chains when they receive products before starting the 
commercial shifts. 
2.2. Consolidation strategy analysis (Strategy C)
The modelling approach of this collaborative urban distri-
bution measure is identical to the methodology presented 
in Estrada and Roca-Riu (2017). However, in this paper 
we now complement the mathematical formulation to ad-
dress the criteria by which the cost savings are divided 
into the different collaborative stakeholders (i.e. carriers 
and CF operator). We consider the same assumptions 
regarding demand distribution, number of carriers, char-
acteristics of the carrier fleet and maximal product size 
delivered by carriers in Strategy A. 
In this case, CF operator defines the maximal prod-
uct volume ( )max max maxu u y≤  that it is able to distribute 
with its own fleet to the final retailers. From the experience 
gathered in a pilot test conducted in Barcelona (Navarro 
et al. 2016), the size of the fleet typology chosen by CF 
operator is lower than the corresponding to carriers, since 
the former has to be adapted to the urban street layout. 
Therefore, given the maximal parcel volume admitted by 
CF operator, carriers usually route the smallest products 
through the CF, while they operate with its own regular 
fleet the biggest products from distribution centres to the 
retailers’ location. We suppose that all retailers ordering a 
parcel maxky u≤  will be routed through the CF and tran-
shipped to the vehicles operated by CF operator. 
Hence, umax is considered a decision variable that 
strongly affects the CF operator profitability. Indeed, the 
fraction of deliveries routed through the CF from a single 
carrier ( )1, ...,i i M=  is estimated by ( )maxF y u= , where 
( )F y  is the cumulative distribution function of the par-
cel volume. Therefore, the receiver suitability to be served 
through CF is based on the parcel volume demanded. This 
is a novel condition compared with Strategy B, where the 
fraction m did not depend on the volumetric conditions 
of each receiver. On the contrary, each carrier will serve 
with the regular distribution network a total amount 
of ( )( )max1iN F u⋅ −  receivers whose parcel volume is 
maxky u> .
The major economic changes on stakeholders caused 
by Strategy C are addressed by comparison to the regu-
lar distribution. Regular distribution is equivalent to the 
Strategy A, in which all shipments are distributed during 
commercial hours by regular carriers (Figure 2a). In Strat-
egy C, we suppose that all carriers may distribute the same 
fraction of products ( )maxF u , ( )( )max0 1F u≤ ≤ , through 
the CF. The pending products ( )( )max1iN F u⋅ −  of a car-
rier i will be distributed using the regular carrier fleet (as 
in Strategy A). We suppose that each carrier pays a flat 
fare qC to CF operator for each parcel distributed through 
CF. Therefore, in this Strategy C, the income experienced 
by the CF operator due to the unit fare per parcel will 
be ( )maxCF N F uq ⋅ ⋅ . Considering the new operational 
scheme of Strategy C, we may identify three different 
route stages. The first one consists of the distribution of 
products from the distribution centres in the surround-
ings of the city to the CF (Figure 2b), where the fleet of 
each collaborating carrier ( )1, ...,Mi i =  will run over a 
distance ,CLH iD  spending a total travel time CiT . The second 
stage (Figure 2c) is characterized by the regular distribu-
tion of those products that carrier ( )1, ...,Mi i =  cannot 
distribute through the CF. Carriers must use an additional 
fleet to deliver these fraction of products ( )( )max1iN F u⋅ −  
to the final retailers, overcoming an access distance to 
the city ,RLH iD , and a local distance within the city lim-
Figure 2. Comparison of distribution phases in Strategy A (a) and  
Strategy C (b – cooperative carrier, c – regular carrier, d – CF operator)
Strategy A Strategy C
a) b) c) d)
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F(u)ЧN  retailersi
Regular carrier
(1 – F(u))ЧN  retailersi
CF operator
F(u)ЧN  retailersi
D D D D
CF location
DALH,i
DAL,i
DCLH,i
DRLH,i
DRL,i
DCFL D
CF
LH
+
r
Transport, 2018, 33(4): 930–947 937
its ,RL iD . The total time spent in this stage is captured by 
( )( ), , max1
R R
L i LH iR
i i
L LH
D D
T N F u
v v
= + + t ⋅⋅ − . Eventually, the 
third stage (Figure 2d) is the one operated by the CF 
operator. The urban fleet of the CF operator distributes 
all products consolidated at the CF belonging to all M 
collaborating carriers ( )maxN F u⋅  from the CF to the 
final retailers. In this stage, the total distance covered is 
CF CF
L LHD D+  (local and access distance from CF location 
to each distribution zone) and the required distributing 
time is CFT . In this case, we suppose a new unit distance 
and new temporal costs CFdc , CFtc  different from the regular 
carrier fleet. Moreover, the CF operator will incur a new 
daily cost W (€/day) associated to the facility investment 
and operating cost. The local and access distance as well as 
the routing time estimations can be made using Equations 
(2a–c); replacing the number of retailers Ni, the maximal 
number of retailers that a vehicle can serve in one tour y 
and the stopping time to serve each retailer t by the cor-
responding parameter to each situation, stakeholder and 
fleet typology. 
For a given city, the consolidation strategy (Strategy C) 
should guarantee a positive profitability to all stakehold-
ers involved: collaborative carriers, CF operator and the 
city itself. Retailers are excluded from this analysis since 
they do not experience any transportation cost modifica-
tion. The necessary condition to be fulfilled in order to 
ensure a positive profitability for carrier ( )1, ...,Mi i =  is 
that the quotient  between the costs of Strategy C and the 
corresponding to Strategy A, denoted by hC, should be 
lower than 1 (Equation 6). The necessary condition for a 
city is that the quotient hE,C between the monetary cost of 
the emissions in Strategy C and Strategy A must be lower 
than 1 ( , 1E Ch ≤  in Equation (7)). The variable ( )CF Lvε  
represents the emission monetary cost estimation of pol-
lutants CO2, NOx and PM2.5 caused by the fleet managed 
by CF operator. Finally, the necessary condition to ensure 
that the incomes from carriers’ fare are greater than the 
operating and investment cost incurred by CF operator is 
stated in Equation (8) (DCF > 0). The term SCF captures the 
potential subsidies or other incomes that CF operator can 
experience from other stakeholders (advertisements, etc.).
, 1C i
a
b
h = ≤ , i∀ ,  (6)
where:
( ), , ,C R Rd LH i LH i L ia c D D D+ +⋅= +
( ) ( )maxC Rt i i CF ic T T N F u⋅ ⋅ ⋅q+ + ;
( ), ,A A Ad L i LH i t ib c D D c T⋅ + ⋅= + ;
, 1E C
a
b
h = ≤ ,  (7)
where:
( ) ( )( , ,
1
L
M
i
C R
LH i LH i Ha D D v
=
= + ⋅ε +∑
( ) ( ) ( )),CF CF CF RL LH L L i LD D v D v⋅ ε + ⋅+ ε ;
( ) ( )( ), ,
1
A A
L i L LH L
i
i
M
Hb D v D v
=
= ε⋅ ε⋅+∑ ;
( )max
1
M
CF CF i CF
i
N F u S
=
 
D = q + − 

⋅ ⋅

∑
( ) 0CF CF CF CF CFL LH tdc D D c T⋅+⋅ − − W ≥ .  (8)
The necessary conditions defined through Equations 
(6)–(8) depend on two decision variables that define the 
collaboration between carriers and CF operator. The first 
one is the maximal parcel volume that is accepted at CF, 
that defines the fraction of parcels ( )maxF u  that will be 
routed through the CF. The second variable is the fare qCF 
that collaborating carriers are going to pay to CF operator 
for handling parcels and routing them to the final retailers. 
This fare qCF should satisfy two conditions: (1) it should 
be higher than the average transport cost per parcel that 
the CF operator incurs zCF and (2) it should be lower than 
the transportation cost saving per parcel that collaborating 
carrier will experience when it moves from Strategy A to 
Strategy C – DzCA. Therefore, the actual fare should range 
in the domain CF CACFz z≤ q ≤ D . The determination of 
this fare within the previous domain constraints the al-
location of the benefits among collaborating stakeholders. 
The higher boundary implies that all the benefits of Strat-
egy C are allocated to CF operator through the fare qCF, 
and collaborating carriers do not foresee any cost vari-
ation when passing from Strategy A to Strategy C. The 
lower boundary represents that the CF operator’s incomes 
coming from the fare qCF are equal to the costs that this 
agent will incur. In this situation, the collaborating carri-
ers will experience the highest profitability of their partici-
pation in this initiative. 
In order to analyse different collaboration schemes be-
tween carriers and CF operator, we propose two criteria to 
determine the fare qCF in Strategy C: 
 – The first criterion, called MinFare, sets the fare equal 
to the average cost per parcel incurred by CF op-
erator when operating the consolidation service, i.e. 
CF
CF zq = . The carrier profitability is analysed for a 
wide domain of retailer density, although carrier cost 
savings are not achieved in multiple combinations of 
input parameters. 
 – The second criterion distributes the cost savings 
achieved by consolidation strategies to both carrier 
and CF operator. The analysis is only performed 
when the unit cost savings experienced by a collabo-
rating carrier is higher than the unit cost incurred 
by CF operator, CA CFz zD ≥ . As carrier has become 
the agent that presents more inconveniences to ac-
cept the new distribution scheme of Strategy C, we 
define ( )0.3CF CA CFCF z z zq = + ⋅ D − . This criterion, 
referred to Fare30–70, proposes a good incentive for 
carriers to move from Strategy A to Strategy C. Only 
the 30% of the available cost savings per parcel result-
ing from this new scheme will be actually allocated to 
CF operator by means of the fare qCF. 
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3. Discussion
A sensitivity analysis of the profitability of the main stake-
holders is presented with regard to the number of retailers 
that are going to be served with the collaborating Strategy 
B and C. This number of retailers will be a function of the 
density of retailers to be visited in one day and the fraction 
of them that are going to be served by Strategy B (night 
distribution) or Strategy C (through a CF). 
For all strategies A, B and C, we consider that re-
tailers are scattered in a rectangle-shaped city of area 
A  =  3 × 2  km2. A set of M  =  10 carriers with the same 
market share is considered to distribute parcels to retailers 
in the same city of area A = 3 × 2 km2. The total density of 
retailers served by all carriers ranges 1,1000 d∈   receiv-
ers/km2; then, the corresponding density served by one 
carrier is 0.1, 100
10i
d  d = ∈    receivers/km
2. Therefore, 
the range of customer’s density is identical for all Strate-
gies A, B and C. The distribution centres of all carriers 
are supposed to be located at 20 km away with regard to 
the centre of the rectangular area. In regular conditions, 
the cruising speed in the access and local network dur-
ing commercial hours is respectively vLH = 60 km/h and 
vL = 20 km/h. The corresponding stopping time to visit 
one retailer in the regular distribution is t = 0.05 h. The 
parameters are proposed to represent the regular kin-
ematic characteristics of urban distribution, according to 
a pilot test conducted in Barcelona in 2014 (Navarro et al. 
2016). We suppose that the shipment size demanded by 
each receiver yk is a random variable that is distributed 
uniformly in the domain (0; 0.3] m3. The maximal thresh-
old is defined according to the actual maximal package 
size handled by a well-known logistics service provider in 
normal conditions (DHL 2013). 
In Strategy B, we analyse the profitability of a single 
collaborative carrier ( )1, ..., 10i i =  as a function of the 
spatial density of retailers and the fraction of receiv-
ers that moved to night distribution strategy 0,1 m∈  
. 
In the analysis of night distribution, two scenarios are 
considered. On one hand, Scenario 1.1 determines that 
the carrier will use a common fleet technology in the day 
and night distribution period of capacity C = 9 m3 (light 
truck) and unit cost parameters cd = 0.28 €/veh⋅km and 
ct = 23.49 €/veh⋅h. Therefore, it needs the same typology 
of fleet as in Strategy A. These factors have been defined 
considering the results of a regional freight transport ob-
servatory conducted in Catalonia (Spain), (Generalitat 
de Catalunya 2015). On the other hand, in Scenario 1.2, 
we consider that the collaborative carrier will operate the 
night distribution with commercial vehicles of higher ca-
pacity, CN = 25 m3, that corresponds to a medium truck. 
The agreement between metrics of Scenarios 1.1 and 1.2 
will measure the effect of enlarging the fleet size in the 
night distribution on carrier’s cost. It is supposed that car-
riers will need less vehicles to operate the service, result-
ing in lower mileage and emissions. However, the effect 
on transportation cost is not clear in advance, since dif-
ferent unit cost parameters for these vehicles have to be 
considered in the night distribution period ( Ndc = 0.36 €/
veh×km and Ntc  = 27.89 €/veh×h) according to Generali-
tat de Catalunya (2015). The crucial issues in the analysis 
of Scenario 1.1 and 1.2 are the determination of cruising 
speeds at night period, which are higher than the corre-
sponding values in the daily distribution and lower stop-
ping times: NLv = 30 km/h, NLHv = 80 km/h and 0.5Nt = ⋅ t. 
In the consolidation strategy (Strategy C), the deploy-
ment of an UsA in the city has a corresponding facility 
cost of W = 46 €/h (Navarro et al. 2016). This value takes 
into account the operating and depreciation cost of the 
equipment needed. We suppose that regular carriers op-
erate the distribution network under Strategy A with the 
same fleet of capacity C = 9 m3. Three different scenarios 
are proposed regarding the CF operator fleet technology, 
defined by its capacity, cost parameters and energy used. 
In Scenario 2.1, we consider that the fleet used by the CF 
operator to distribute products from CF to the final retail-
ers is maintained as in Strategy A. This fleet consists of 
diesel-powered engine vehicles with a volumetric capac-
ity CCF = 9 m3. In Scenario 2.2, the CF operator fleet is 
replaced by fully electric vans of capacity CCF = 2.16 m3, 
CF
dc = 0.032 €/veh⋅km and CFtc = 22.14 €/veh⋅h. This sce-
nario represents that all CF fleet is electric and does not 
contribute to worsen the air quality of the urban area. 
Note that the vehicle capacity considered in Scenario 2.2 is 
less than the corresponding value in Scenario 2.1 because 
of the limited availability of fully-electric commercial ve-
hicles. As far as the authors are concerned, there is not any 
fully electric truck of capacity CCF = 9 m3 or higher in the 
market. Therefore, the agreement between Scenario 2.1 
and 2.2 will capture the effect of replacing ICE vehicles by 
full electric vehicles on carriers cost and environment. The 
unit distance cost has been defined according to the aver-
age electric vehicle consumption per km and the average 
electricity fares [€/kW⋅h] in Spain. Finally, Scenario 2.3 
explores the usage of electric cargo bikes in the last mile 
distribution performed by the CF operator. As this fleet is 
allowed to run along the sidewalks and it can be parked in 
front of retailer’s shops, we considered that the stop time 
per receiver tCF is one half of the corresponding param-
eter in Strategy A. Cruising speeds are conservatively con-
sidered to be the same as regular carrier fleet (Strategy A). 
This fleet will present the lowest vehicle capacity and unit 
cost parameters: CCF = 1.2 m3, CFdc = 0.015 €/veh⋅km and 
CF
tc = 15.54 €/veh⋅h. The agreement of Scenarios 2.3 and 
2.2 will explain the effect of reducing the unit cost param-
eters of the CF electric fleet on environment and carrier 
profitability. All input parameters are defined in Table 1.
3.1. Night distribution measure. Strategy B
The results of night distribution measure in Scenario 1.1 are 
plotted in Figure 3a (hN ratio) and 3b (hE ratio). These ratios 
determine the carrier cost and emission savings achieved 
by Strategy B with regard to Strategy A. The boundaries 
between different value ranges of both ratios depicted in 
Figures 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b present multiple discontinuities. 
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Table 1. Summary of the input parameters considered in the analysis
Notation Concept Numerical values
City
A Area of the city [km2] 6
ymax Maximal parcel volume to be distributed in the city by regular carriers in Strategy A [m3] 0.3
Carrier
M Number of collaborating carriers 10 
i
i
N
N
φ = Market share of each collaborating carrier i(i = 1, …, M) qi = 0.1
ri
Distance between distribution centre and gravity centre of the distribution area within the 
city [km] 20
ct Unit temporal cost of regular carrier vehicles in the day distribution, Strategy A [€/veh⋅h]*1 23.49 
cd Unit distance cost of regular carrier vehicles in the day distribution, Strategy A [€/veh⋅km]*1 0.280 
N
tc Unit temporal cost of carrier vehicles used in night distribution, Strategy B [€/veh⋅h]*1
23.49 (Scenario 1.1); 
27.89 (Scenario 1.2)
N
dc Unit distance cost of carrier vehicles used in night distribution, Strategy B [€/veh⋅km]*1
0.280 (Scenario 1.1); 
0.36 (Scenario 1.2)
C Capacity of the carrier vehicle used in the regular distribution, Strategy A [m3]*1 9 
CN Capacity of the carrier vehicle used in night distribution, Strategy B [m3]*1 9 (Scenario 1.1); 25 (Scenario 1.2)
vL, vLH
Cruising speed of the regular carrier vehicles in the local and access distribution phase,  
day conditions, Strategy A [km/h] 20, 60
N
Lv , 
N
LHv
Cruising speed of the carrier vehicles in the local and access distribution phase, night 
conditions, Strategy B [km/h] 30, 80 (Scenario 1)
t Time needed by regular carrier vehicle to perform a retailer delivery [h] 0.05 (all strategies)
t′ Time needed by cooperative carrier vehicle to visit the CF, Strategy C [h] 0.25 (Scenario 2)
tN Time needed by carrier vehicle to perform a retailer delivery at night period, Strategy B [h] 0.025 (Scenario 1)
( )j Le v , 
( )j LHe v
Emission factor of pollutant j corresponding to carrier vehicle cruising at speed vL (local) 
and vLH (access) [g of pollutant j /veh⋅km]
– CO2 / NOx / PM2.5 emission factor [g/veh⋅km]*2 in local distribution 293.32 / 0.724 / 0.00188
– CO2 / NOx / PM2.5 emission factor [g/veh⋅km]*2 in access distribution 193.026 / 0.626 / 0.00089
CF operator, Strategy C
CF
tc Unit temporal cost of CF operator vehicles [€/veh⋅h] *1
23.49 (Scenario 2.1); 
22.14 (Scenario 2.2); 
15.54 (Scenario 2.3)
CF
dc Unit distance cost of CF operator vehicles [€/veh⋅km]
0.280 (Scenario 2.1); 
0.032 (Scenario 2.2); 
0.015 (Scenario 2.3)
CCF Capacity of the CF operator vehicle [m3] 
9 (Scenario 2.1); 
2.16 (Scenario 2.2); 
1.20 (Scenario 2.3)
W Facility cost [€/day] 46.00 
qCF Fare per parcel to be paid by collaborating carrier [€/parcel] variable
tCF Time needed by CF operator vehicle to perform a retailer delivery [h] 0.025
( )CFje v Emission factor of pollutant j corresponding to CF operator vehicle cruising at speed vL (local) [g of pollutant j /veh×km]
293.32 / 0.724 / 0.00188 
(Scenario 2.1); 
0 (Scenarios 2.2 and 2.3)
Externalities
$ j
Monetary cost of pollutant j:
monetary CO2 weighting factor [€/kg]*3 0.00768
monetary NOx weighting factor [€/kg]*4 6.3
monetary PM2.5 weighting factor [€/kg]*4 48
Notes: *1 in accordance to Generalitat de Catalunya (2015); *2 in accordance to EMEP/EEA (2013), assuming EURO V for light com-
mercial vehicles <3.5 t, Tier 3; *3 average value for year 2015, according to SENDECO2 (2016); *4 in accordance to Holland et al. (2005).
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This fact is due to the discrete nature of the number of 
tours captured by variable i
N + 
 y 
 in Equation (2a). The 
peaks of these boundaries correspond to a variation of 
the fleet size between both sides of the curve. The night 
distribution measure, Strategy B, forces that the same area 
of the city should be visited twice (m fraction at night pe-
riod and 1 – m fraction at day period). Therefore, the to-
tal distance run by the whole fleet is generally higher in 
Strategy B than in Strategy A. For this reason, Strategy B 
always presents in this Scenario 1.1 (same fleet of capac-
ity C = CN = 9 m3) an increment of the monetary value of 
emissions ranging from 1.0 to 1.9. However, the collabora-
tive carrier will experience a reduction of transportation 
cost (values 0 < hN < 1) when m > 0.46 and the retailer 
density to be served is di > 10 receivers/km2. This fact hap-
pens because, in night distribution, the temporal costs in-
curred by carriers are significantly lower than Strategy A 
due to the higher cruising speed, and this cost component 
is generally more important than the distance component. 
The higher the retailer density di and m fraction are; the 
more efficient Strategy B is. In this Scenario 1.1, Strategy 
B is able to reduce the carrier cost by more than 30% with 
regard to Strategy A (hN < 0.7, white area in Figure 3a). 
Figures 4a and 4b represent, respectively, hN and hE ratio 
in Scenario 1.2, where a vehicle capacity has set to CN = 25 
m3 in night deliveries. This vehicle technology reduces the 
total transportation carrier cost with regard to Scenario 
1.1 for significant high retailer density and m fraction in 
the domain considered. Interestingly, in this Scenario 1.2, 
the system can achieve emissions savings as the hE ratio 
ranges between 0.6…1.0 for high retailer density and m 
fraction values. Therefore, night distribution may result 
in transportation cost savings due to the more productive 
usage of vehicles in off-peak periods. In order to obtain 
emission savings, the deployment of a fleet of bigger ca-
pacity is recommended. However, this fact is never pos-
sible when the density of retailers that will be served at 
night period is di < 20 night receivers/km2, whatever the 
m-fraction is. Generally, the variations of hN ratio are more 
sensitive to changes in the fraction of receivers that take 
part in night distribution m when a minimal receiver de-
mand density is ensured. This fact can be noticed in Fig-
ures 3a and 4a as the hN  ranges are almost vertical bands 
when di > 20 receivers/km2, despite the discontinuities.
3.2. Carrier-led Consolidation measure. Strategy C
The analysis of results in Strategy C are presented in Fig-
ures 5–8 with regard to density of receivers and ( )maxF u  
when the fare qCF is set by MinFare criterion defined in 
Section 2.2. 
Figure 3. Results in Scenario 1.1 (CN = 9 m3): a – hN ratio; b – hE ratio
Figure 4. Results in Scenario 1.2 (CN = 25 m3): a – hN ratio; b – hE ratio
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Since the fare qCF equals the average unit transporta-
tion and facility cost per parcel (routed through CF) that 
CF operator incurs, the variable DCF is always 0. When CF 
operator chooses the same fleet used by collaborative carri-
er (Scenario 2.1, CCF = 9 m3), the collaborative carrier will 
never achieve logistic cost savings (hC > 1 in Figure 5a). 
The fare to be paid by collaborative carrier (qCF  > 1.20 €/
parcel in Figure 5b) is always higher than the transporta-
tion cost savings that it incurs. In addition to that, there is 
not generally any benefit in the emissions produced with 
this strategy. In Figure 8a, we can notice that hE,C > 1 for 
the general application domain of study  – di, ( )maxF u  . 
Figure 5. Results in Scenario 2.1 (CCF = 9 m3) with MinFare criterion: a – hC ratio; b – fare qCF [€]
Figure 6. Results in Scenario 2.2 (CCF = 2.16 m3) with MinFare criterion: a – hC ratio; b – fare qCF [€]
Figure 7. Results in Scenario 2.3 (CCF = 1.2 m3) with MinFare criterion: a – hC ratio; b – fare qCF [€]
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Only when a carrier routes the vast majority of parcels 
through CF, i.e. ( ) 1F u → , we can achieve emissions sav-
ings with this strategy (green subdomain in Figure 8a).
In Scenarios 2.2 (electric van) and 2.3 (electric cargo-
bike), the collaborative carrier may experience a positive 
profitability when moving from Strategy A (regular distri-
bution) to Strategy C. From Figures 6a and 7a, the logistic 
cost reduction of collaborative carrier ranges 0.8 < hC < 1. 
We always obtain hC ≤ 1 in Scenario 2.2 when di > 10 re-
tailers/km2 and ( )max 0.65F u > ; and in Scenario 2.3 when 
di > 9 retailers/km2 and ( )max 0.49F u > . The profitability 
of collaborative carrier is the highest in Scenario 2.3. This 
is due to the input cost parameters associated to the CF 
operator fleet. When CF operator runs the local network 
with a more economically fleet, the necessary fare qCF to 
balance the CF operator profitability does not increase 
significantly. For instance, the fare in the case of e-cargo 
bikes (Figure 7b) is lower than qCF < 1.00 €/parcel in a 
wide domain of analysis – di, ( )maxF u . The fare ( )CF Pq  
associated to any point ( )( ), ,i p pP d F u=  in Scenario 2.3 
is always lower than corresponding values in Scenario 2.1 
(Figure 5b) or Scenario 2.2 (Figure 6b). Therefore, col-
laborative carrier will pay less for participating in the col-
laborative consolidation strategy. The results in terms of 
emission saving are promising when CF operator distrib-
utes freight with a fully electric fleet. Both Scenarios 2.2 
and 2.3 provide the same values of hE,C (Figure 8b) since 
these scenarios only differ in the capacity of the electric 
fleet, which does not generate pollutants. 
When the fare qCF is set by Fare30–70 criterion, the 
profitability metrics for all stakeholders involved dif-
fer from the results obtained by MinFare criterion qCF = 
zCF. In Figures 9a, 9b and 11a the hC  ratio, DCF variable 
(accounting for the CF profitability) and fare qCF are re-
spectively plotted for Scenario 2.2 in the same domain of 
analysis. Figures 10a, 10b and 11b present the correspond-
ing variables for Scenario 2.3. The values of ratios hE,C are 
not presented since they are identical to the ones obtained 
in Figure 8b when MinFare criterion was used. 
Figure 8. hE,C ratio with MinFare criterion: a – results in Scenario 2.1 (CCF = 9 m3);  
b – results in Scenarios 2.2 (CCF = 2.16 m3) and 2.3 (CCF = 1.2 m3)
Figure 9. Results in Scenario 2.2 (CCF = 2.4 m3) with Fare30–70 criterion: a – hC ratio; b – CF operator profitability DCF [€/day]
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Figure 10. Results in Scenario 2.3 (CCF = 1.2 m3) with Fare30–70 criterion: a – hC ratio; b – CF operator profitability DCF [€/day]
Figure 11. Fare qCF [€]: a – results in Scenario 2.2 (CCF = 2.4 m3); b – results in Scenario 2.3 (CCF = 1.2 m3)
Figure 12. Results when all shipments are made by means of a collaborative strategy: a – hC ratio; b – hE or hE,C ratio
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The selection of electric vans (CCF  =  2.16  m3) used 
to make deliveries from CF to final retailers achieve re-
ductions of carrier expenses of 10%  – hC  = 0.90, when 
( )max 1F u → . The transportation cost savings achieve-
ments in Scenario 2.3 are slightly higher than Scenario 
2.2, while the region fulfilling hC < 0.90 is wider. In Fig-
ures 9–11, there is a wide domain of unfeasible points di,
( )maxF u  that verify DzCA < zCF. It means that the car-
rier cost saving is lower than the average cost per par-
cel handled by CF operator at the consolidation strategy. 
Therefore, this unfeasible domain represents the area in 
which the proposed business model (Fare30–70 criterion) 
does not ensure positive profitability for both carrier and 
CF operator. Out of this domain, the CF operator may 
experience a positive profitability, with benefits ranging 
from 0 < DCF < 405 (Scenario 2.2) and 0 < DCF < 550 €/
day (Scenario 2.3). Reasonably, the fares qCF calculated by 
this criterion are slightly higher than the results provided 
in Figures 6b and 7b when MinFare criterion was used. 
Scenario 2.1 has neither achieved carrier cost reduc-
tions nor emission savings in the general retailer’s demand 
domain of analysis with Fare30–70 criterion. The utiliza-
tion of the same fleet by carriers and CF operator increas-
es the overall transportation cost incurred by all agents. 
In addition to that, as a difference from Scenarios 2.2 and 
2.3, the local distribution is made by internal combustion 
engine powered vehicles that contribute to increase the 
externalities caused by pollutants. Although new fully 
electric commercial vehicles will rise in the future years 
of capacity roughly C = 9 m3, these vehicles will be also 
used in Strategies A and C. Therefore, the consolidation 
strategy cannot be justified from this perspective. 
3.3. Comparison of Strategies B and C  
at full collaboration 
In this section, we analyse the potential achievements 
when Strategies B or C are implemented considering that 
all receivers are served by means of a collaborative strat-
egy. It means that when Strategy B or C are considered, 
there is not any carrier fleet visiting receivers during the 
day shift (commercial hours). All receivers will be served 
at night or by means of the CF operator fleet. This situa-
tion is considered in the model by m = 1 (Strategy B) or 
( )max 1F u =  and could not be properly depicted in Figures 
3–10 since it represents a severe discontinuity with regard 
to the rest of the variable domain. In spite of the low prob-
ability that this ideal change will happen (some receivers 
and carriers would be reluctant to move to Strategy B or 
C as reported in Holguín-Veras et al. 2015), this situation 
determines the best demand conditions for the application 
of these strategies. Figures 12a and 12b depict respectively 
the values of hC and hE ratios (hE,C in case of Strategy 
C) for the range of receiver density considered. The per-
centage of reduction of carrier cost by means of full col-
laborative strategies with regard to Strategy A (hC ratio) is 
practically constant for all retailer density domain. Indeed, 
Strategy B is able to reduce the carrier costs by 40% in 
both Scenarios 1.1 and 1.2. However, the emission reduc-
tion can only be achieved when carriers use a vehicle of a 
higher capacity (Scenario 1.2). In this Scenario, for high 
demand density values, the amount of emissions can be 
reduced by 40…50%. A fact that deserves mention is the 
value hE,C  = 1 obtained in the whole domain of analy-
sis in Scenario 1.1. It means that the distribution at night 
provides the same level of emissions as in the day period 
when the fleet technology is maintained. This fact happens 
although cruising speeds are higher at night. The expla-
nation is that the model selected to estimate commercial 
vehicle emissions (EMEP/EEA 2013) is able to provide 
different emissions factors for the city access and local 
phases of the route. However, this model is not sensitive 
enough to modify emission factors when cruising speeds 
are increased by 10 … 20%.
The values of hC ratio obtained with Strategy C are 
generally poorer than Strategy B for the same problems 
and demand assumptions, and they depend on the crite-
rion by which cost savings are divided into carriers and 
CF operator. The hC ratio fluctuates between (0.78…0.96). 
The highest carrier cost reduction is obtained when CF 
operator manages the local distribution network with elec-
tric cargo bikes (Scenario 2.3). Although all carriers would 
switch to route their shipments through a CF, the utiliza-
tion of the same fleet in the long-haul and local network 
(Scenario 2.1) will always increase the carrier cost (hC > 1). 
Nevertheless, a small percentage of emission savings could 
be obtained for a wide receiver density range. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the new effects produced by 
two well-known collaboration measures on the different 
stakeholders involved in urban distribution: Night dis-
tribution and carrier-led consolidation strategies. Both 
measures are only profitable for all agents when a minimal 
spatial density of retailers participating in the strategy is 
achieved. Below this density, some agents incur in higher 
costs than in regular conditions, that will make them lose 
competitiveness against similar companies, and therefore, 
they will no longer take part in this collaborative scheme. 
Comparing the results obtained with night distribu-
tion (Strategy B) and carrier-led consolidation measure 
(Strategy C), we may realize that Strategy B generally 
outperforms Strategy C in terms of transportation cost 
savings. Night distribution does neither include a new 
facility cost nor time penalties in the system and allows 
a better productivity of resources. However, it is manda-
tory to foster incentive programs promoting unattended 
deliveries in order to gain the acceptance of retailers 
to receive products at night periods. In the case of the 
night-time distribution of goods, collaborative carriers 
that move from day to night distribution may reduce the 
transportation costs due to the higher cruising speed of 
vehicles in the night period. The highest carrier transpor-
tation cost reduction with regard to Strategy A is roughly 
30%, when a collaborative carrier also distributes some 
shipments during the day period m < 1. This achievement 
is highly similar to the practical results achieved in pilot 
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test conducted in New York, Bogotá and Sao Pablo. How-
ever, results show that this percentage of transportation 
cost reduction can achieve the 40% – hN = 0.60, when all 
shipments are switched to night deliveries m  = 1. It has 
been demonstrated that the reduction of carrier cost is 
more sensitive to the variations of the fraction of receivers 
switched to night distribution rather than variations in re-
ceiver density. This is only true when a minimal density of 
receivers is ensured – di > 20 receivers/km2. Nevertheless, 
from the emission perspective, night distribution needs to 
consolidate more shipments in vehicles and, therefore, the 
usage of bigger trucks in night period to achieve emission 
savings is required. Carriers do not want to operate with 
vehicles of greater capacity because, by using smaller ve-
hicles, they assure the reduction of costs (Holguín-Veras 
2002). Moreover, larger vehicles have usually restrictions 
in some parts of the cities (especially old city centres with 
narrow streets). In this regard, public administrations 
could play an important role providing incentives to pur-
chase these larger (and silent) vehicles to be used dur-
ing the night. The main challenge for the development of 
night-time distribution is to encourage retailers to support 
this new paradigm. In this paper we have demonstrated 
that its implementation has positive economic effects on 
carriers and environment, but the effect on receivers has 
not been addressed by developed models. Therefore, the 
latter needs external economic mechanisms (incentives) 
to justify its involvement. In the long run, once the ini-
tial incentives have been provided, night distribution can 
reconcile the goals of carriers, receivers, shippers and the 
city without any type of incentive, overcharge or tempo-
rary penalty.
Regarding consolidation strategies, results show that 
these are only valid when carriers transfer a large frac-
tion of goods through the consolidation centre ( )maxF u  . Consequently, it is not a universal measure for any city, 
since it needs a strong involvement of carriers and receiv-
ers in the short term to present positive results. For each 
implementation, it is necessary to verify that a minimum 
return is achieved for a carrier, CF operator and emis-
sions savings for the city. From the sensitivity analysis, 
the maximal expenses reduction for carriers is roughly 
15…20% in the domain of analysis when the vast majority 
of goods are routed through the CF and the fare is set to 
only compensate CF operator costs. However, if we oblige 
that CF operator will receive a minimal profit (the 30% of 
the total transport cost savings experienced by the carrier, 
including the fare qCF payment), the collaborative carrier 
expense is only reduced by 10…15% at the most. In this 
strategy, the capacity of the fleet used for distributing 
parcels from the CF to the final retailers should be lower 
than the corresponding to the carrier in the access phase. 
However, the CF fleet must present lower unit transporta-
tion costs and emissions factors than carrier fleet. In fact, 
the usage of electric cargo bikes or small electric vans is 
recommended. The development of this measure requires 
private contracts between the carriers and the CF operator 
to agree the fare to pay for a package sent through the CF, 
variable that plays a very important role in the profitability 
of both agents. However, the development of this strategy 
can be carried out without the direct participation of those 
agents that control the economic decisions of goods con-
sumption: receivers and suppliers.
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